The German climb

1 The war in Ukraine has entered a new and delicate phase with Germany’s recent change of position on the geographical limits imposed on the use of weapons supplied to Kiev. After long months of strategic hesitation on the part of Berlin, the coming to power of Chancellor Friedrich Merz on 6 May 2025 marked a significant doctrinal shift in German defence policy. This change not only has implications for the Ukrainian battlefield, but also raises profound concerns about European and global strategic stability. At the heart of the debate is Merz’s decision to lift the range restrictions imposed on weapons supplied to Kiev, in particular with regard to German Taurus cruise missiles.

2 Germany initially adopted a cautious approach to military support for Ukraine, avoiding providing long-range weapons for fear of an uncontrolled Russian reaction. Such caution is not surprising, considering the weight of history: Germany was at the origin of both world wars, and Russia (or the Soviet Union) was the country that suffered the most casualties in both conflicts. During the First World War, Russia suffered around 1.7 million military deaths—the highest number among the European belligerents. In the Second World War, it suffered catastrophic losses: not counting civilian casualties, around 8.7 million deaths, the highest number of casualties of all the countries involved. Even discounting the Stalinist purges, it is still a devastating number.

Under the previous government of Olaf Scholz, Berlin repeatedly refused to authorize the deployment of Taurus missiles — German-made and with a range of over 500 km — precisely because of the risks of escalation that their use could entail. This policy of restricting the transfer of weapons capable of reaching deep into Russian territory was intended to prevent Germany from being perceived as a party directly involved in the conflict.

With the recent inauguration of Friedrich Merz, however, this approach has changed dramatically. Merz has publicly stated that “there are no longer any range limitations on weapons delivered to Ukraine” by Western allies. In other words, Berlin is ready to allow Kiev to use Western weapons to strike targets on Russian soil, something that had previously been virtually taboo. Although Merz did not explicitly mention the immediate deployment of Taurus missiles during his press conference with President Volodymyr Zelensky, he clearly implied that the restriction on the use of such weapons was being lifted as part of a broader alignment between key allies. Indeed, France and the United Kingdom have already supplied Kiev with equivalent long-range cruise missiles (the SCALP/Storm Shadow), and the United States has gradually extended restrictions on the deployment of American weapons near Russia’s borders. Merz’s Germany has signaled that it does not want to be left behind: “We will do everything” to support Ukraine militarily, the new chancellor promised, in a visible break with the cautious tone of the previous administration.

This change in doctrine represents a reversal of Germany’s previously moderate security policy. Merz himself has taken a much more assertive stance than his predecessor Scholz, in contrast to the reticence that has prevailed in Berlin since the beginning of the Russian invasion. For a country that has for decades cultivated a strategic culture of restraint and dialogue (shaped by the memory of the Cold War and its energy dependence on Russia), the decision to unlock the Taurus ’ geographic boundaries marks a seismic shift. It is about authorizing Ukraine’s capabilities to target military bases and infrastructure on Russian territory – a step that Moscow is sure to interpret as a direct escalation by a leading NATO country.

3 Moscow’s reactions were not long in coming. The Kremlin, through its spokesman Dmitry Peskov, warned that the decision to lift range limitations on Ukrainian strikes constituted “a very dangerous policy change” and Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that Moscow would consider the Taurus missile strikes on its “critical transport infrastructure” as “direct” German involvement in the Ukrainian conflict. From Russia’s point of view, by allowing Kiev to launch deep strikes inside Russia (whether with Taurus or other long-range missiles), Germany and its allies would be crossing another, and this time extremely sensitive, threshold. Fears of escalation have become palpable: institutions such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) warn of the risk that a single miscalculation could precipitate a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO – or worse, induce Moscow to resort to tactical nuclear weapons in an attempt to reverse an unfavorable military trend on the ground. Indeed, the Russian strategic nuclear doctrine, revised in 2024, expanded the conditions under which the use of nuclear weapons is permitted, including in response to a “large-scale” conventional attack against Russia sustained by an opposing nuclear power ( Arms Control ).

The decision by Merz and his NATO allies to remove these range restrictions also increased the dangers of inadvertent escalation. The history of nuclear crises teaches that whenever offensive capabilities capable of striking strategic centers or the homeland of a nuclear power come into play, the chances of misperceptions and disproportionate responses increase exponentially. Episodes such as the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, accidental warnings during the Cold War, and recent tensions over long-range precision strike systems show that the combination of uncertainty, limited decision time, and existential fear tends to favor impulsive or overly aggressive responses.

The RAND Corporation’s 2023 report, “ Understanding the Risk of Escalation in the War in Ukraine, ” distinguished between different types of escalation (horizontal, vertical, deliberate, inadvertent) and concluded that while Moscow has so far avoided certain extreme scenarios—partly out of fear of a direct NATO response and the gradual pace of Western support—there is no guarantee that such restraint will persist. If faced with serious setbacks or threats to its stability, the Kremlin could opt for dangerous escalations, including direct attacks on NATO or even the use of nuclear weapons, despite the catastrophic risks. RAND stresses that it is crucial to maintain the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance—by balancing military support in a way that preserves unity among allies—and to plan coordinated responses to potential Russian escalations, as well as to maintain open channels of communication with Moscow to prevent a spiral out of control.

4 The shift in Berlin comes against a backdrop of a progressive hardening of the stance of Ukraine’s main allies in Europe and North America. In the first months after the 2022 Russian invasion, both Washington and European capitals such as London, Paris and Berlin adopted a cautious stance.

This initial caution resulted in multiple limitations: options such as imposing a no-fly zone or sending NATO troops to Ukrainian territory were immediately ruled out, and the supply of weapons followed a gradual logic. Systems considered to be ‘escalatory’ – Western tanks, long-range missiles or modern fighter jets – were initially excluded from the assistance packages. As Olaf Scholz summed up in 2022, justifying the initial refusal to send Leopard 2 tanks to Kiev and reflecting a concern shared in the West: “NATO must avoid a direct military confrontation with Russia that could lead to a third world war.”

However, as the conflict dragged on and Ukraine failed to secure a decisive victory, the allies gradually revisited their red lines. The United Kingdom was notable for being the first to deliver Storm Shadow cruise missiles to Kiev in mid-2023, breaking the geographical range taboo when it deemed it necessary to bolster Ukraine’s offensive capabilities. France followed suit shortly thereafter, sending SCALP missiles (the French version of Storm Shadow ). The United States also gradually expanded the range of weapons it supplied: from initial portable anti-tank weapons and heavy artillery, it evolved to include advanced air defence systems and high-precision missiles, and finally M1 Abrams tanks. Several NATO countries, including Germany, sent around 100 Leopard 2 tanks and 85 F-16 aircraft, with US authorization. In late 2024, Washington also authorized the discreet deployment of a limited number of ATACMS ballistic missiles, which Kiev has used effectively against Russian-occupied air bases.

This coordinated hardening of stances was accompanied by cautious diplomatic rhetoric. Western leaders reiterated that they were not seeking direct war with Russia. “NATO is not a belligerent party in this conflict,” stressed Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, stressing that support for Ukraine was intended to enable the legitimate defence of an aggrieved country, not to draw the Alliance into a direct confrontation with Russia. Despite the qualitative increase in weapons supplied, the allies sought to strengthen Ukraine militarily without giving Moscow a pretext to expand the theatre of war. This was reflected in the aforementioned geographical restrictions on the use of certain weapons on Russian territory and in reiterating that “there will be no NATO soldiers fighting in Ukraine.” Even in the face of threats such as Putin’s nuclear rhetoric, NATO’s cohesion remained, based on the understanding that giving in would only exacerbate future insecurity.

Meanwhile, the positioning of European allies has also evolved internally. NATO’s frontline countries in Eastern Europe, such as Poland and the Baltic States, have always advocated strong and immediate support for Kiev, understanding that their own security depends on stopping Putin on Ukrainian soil. Powers such as Germany, France and Italy have had to manage divided public opinion and economic interests intertwined with Russia. In Berlin, Scholz faced harsh criticism in 2022 for the slow delivery of heavy weapons, but ended up giving in to allied and domestic pressure, approving the delivery of Leopard 2 tanks and increasing the defense budget. Paris, under Macron, oscillated between initial diplomatic attempts (it even sought dialogue with Putin in the first months) and the recognition that only allied military firmness could deter Moscow – which led France to significantly increase its deliveries of military equipment to Kiev. Rome went from a pro-EU government to a right-wing one under Giorgia Meloni but the latter, despite Euroscepticism, maintained support for Ukraine.

Still, dilemmas remain: maintaining or expanding military aid is vital for Ukraine to resist, but care must be taken to ensure that no action is interpreted by the Kremlin as a casus belli that triggers a direct NATO-Russia confrontation. This fragile balance has defined Western strategy since 2022 – so far effective in avoiding a major war, but without absolute guarantees of lasting security.

5 The intensification of the military effort in Europe is entailing huge economic costs, especially for the continent’s largest economies. Germany, France and Italy – already struggling with challenges such as high inflation, anaemic growth and heavy public debt – are now faced with rapidly expanding defence budgets. Since the start of the war, Europe has seen its largest increase in military spending in decades: in 2024, European military spending grew by around 17% in a single year, surpassing levels at the end of the Cold War ( SIPRI, 2025 ). Germany, in particular, increased its military spending by around 28% that year, to around €85 billion, becoming the largest defence spender in Western Europe for the first time. This leap is largely due to the €100 billion special fund launched by Berlin (the Zeitenwende , or “turn of era”), aimed at re-equipping the German armed forces and meeting the target of 2% of GDP in defence spending. France has also increased its defence budget (+6.1% in 2024, reaching almost €60 billion), with the aim of reaching almost 3% of GDP for defence by 2030. Italy, although starting from a lower level, has committed to gradual increases in its military spending, seeking to move closer to the 2% of GDP target set by NATO, despite the budgetary constraints of a country with public debt exceeding 140% of GDP.

These increased expenditures pose dilemmas in resource allocation. As a SIPRI report points out, governments are prioritising military security “often at the expense of other areas of the budget”, and these economic-social trade-offs can have long-lasting effects on societies. In practice, financing the modernisation of the armed forces and military and economic support for Ukraine means redirecting funds that could otherwise go to civilian investment or social protection. A tension between military and social spending is already evident in several European countries. In France, for example, Macron accompanied the increase in the defence budget with unpopular austerity measures: the controversial pension reform in 2023 – which raised the retirement age and sparked mass protests – was justified by the government as necessary to ensure financial sustainability in a context in which resources were also being channelled into the military. This coincidence gave arguments to opponents, who accused rearmament of being paid for with cuts in social rights, intensifying popular resistance.

Similarly, in Italy, economic fragility limits the government’s options: increasing military investment in a period of stagnation means further reducing the scope for social spending or risking exceeding debt limits. Even in Germany, an exporting powerhouse with more robust public finances, the social cost of rearmament is being debated – critics, including peace movements, point out that the billions invested in tanks and missiles could have been spent on civilian infrastructure or the energy transition.

In general, European civil society is beginning to show signs of unease: while there is still a majority support for helping Ukraine, there is growing fatigue and concern about the domestic repercussions of this prolonged effort. Many citizens fear that the concentration of resources on defence and the persistence of a gruelling economic war – marked by sanctions, energy crises and disruptions to supply chains – will ultimately harm the quality of life and the welfare state in Europe.

The data below show, for each European Union (EU) country, the nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2024 (in millions of euros) and the share (%) of that GDP allocated to military spending in 2024. The year 2024 marked a generalized increase in defense investment in Europe – for example, around 18 NATO member countries have already reached or exceeded the 2% of GDP threshold for military spending in that year. On the other hand, neutral countries or those without traditional military alliances (such as Austria, Ireland, Malta) maintained percentages well below 2%.

The table shows that only a fraction of EU countries met or exceeded the NATO target of 2% of GDP spent on defence in 2024. These include Poland (4.12% of GDP), Estonia (3.43%), Greece (3.08%), Latvia (3.15%) and Lithuania (2.85%), all above 2%. Large economies such as France and Germany also remained slightly above 2%. On the other hand, countries such as Ireland and Malta allocated less than 0.5% of GDP to defence in 2024 – the lowest figures in the bloc.

The countries that need to increase their defence budgets the most to reach the 2% of GDP threshold are Spain and Italy, with very similar figures. In the case of Spain, which currently allocates around 1.3% of GDP to defence, an additional approximately €11.5 billion would be needed to reach the 2% threshold, increasing its budget from around €20.4 billion currently to around €31.8 billion. Italy, on the other hand, would need to add around €11 billion to its budget effort, increasing its military spending from the current 1.5% to 2% of GDP.

As for Portugal, whose Prime Minister announced in his inauguration speech on 5 June 2025 the target of reaching 2% of GDP in defence spending this year, the budgetary challenge is significant: it will be necessary to identify, by December 2025, financing mechanisms to cover an increase estimated at around €1.3 billion — an increase that corresponds to approximately 38% compared to the current level of military spending. Such an effort will require not only adjustments to the budgetary framework, but also a clear definition of priorities in terms of investment in capabilities and financial sustainability.

Finally, the 5% of GDP defence target – initially launched by President Donald Trump in 2024, when he proposed that European allies increase their spending to around 3.5% on ‘hard military expenditure’ and 1.5% on complementary areas such as infrastructure and cybersecurity – has recently been taken up by the new NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte. The proposal, which is expected to be discussed at the next summit in The Hague (24–25 June 2025), envisages the formal establishment of an overall target of 5% of GDP, with an explicit breakdown between military capabilities and associated security components. Achieving this target would imply a significant budgetary increase for all member states, with significant implications for their fiscal, industrial and defence policies, as well as for the domestic political balance in several countries. The proposal reflects, on the one hand, the recognition of the need for more robust deterrence in the current geopolitical context and, on the other, an attempt to structure defence investment more comprehensively, including critical areas such as cyber resilience and the protection of strategic infrastructure. However, no EU country currently reaches 5%: even Poland, with the highest relative share in 2024, is at ~4.1%. Reaching 5% would require very significant investments. For example, Germany – whose military expenditure of ~€91 billion is equivalent to ~2.1% of its GDP – would need to invest an additional €124 billion per year to reach 5% of GDP (i.e., almost tripling its defence budget). Countries with already high relative effort, such as Poland, would need to add around €7.4 billion on top of what they already spend to reach 5%. In general, reaching 5% of GDP on defense would require significant budgetary expansions for all EU members, often politically and economically difficult or even impossible to justify in peacetime.

6 In this environment of economic pressure and prolonged war, the danger of a “political trap” emerges: that of increased military spending, combined with economic stagnation or deterioration, fueling discontent and forces opposed to continued support for Kiev, with negative consequences for European unity, as highlighted in Quincy Brief #64, October 2024, entitled “ The Risks to Germany and Europe of a Prolonged War in Ukraine ”. These forces, which combine Euroscepticism with reluctance to provide assistance to Ukraine, have recently made electoral gains in countries such as Italy, France and Germany. In Italy, for example, the right-wing coalition led by Giorgia Meloni came to power in 2022 partly by exploiting the population’s exhaustion due to the economic crisis. In France, Marine Le Pen and her Rassemblement National party have established themselves as a significant political force by maintaining a Eurosceptic and pro-dialogue stance with Moscow, which appeals to a section of the electorate exasperated by the cost of living. In Germany itself, recent months have shown signs of a significant shift to the right: in the federal election of 23 February 2025, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) – a nationalist party critical of support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia – came second with 20.8% of the vote, an increase of around 10 percentage points compared to 2021, and won 152 seats in the Bundestag, almost double its previous 83 seats, channelling frustrations with high inflation, the energy crisis and the perception that German interests are being undermined by the conflict in the East. In Portugal, the legislative elections of May 18, 2025 saw a significant rise of the right, which, for the first time in half a century, consolidated itself as the main opposition force.

This erosion of the European pro-Ukraine consensus is also evident elsewhere on the continent. In Slovakia, former populist Prime Minister Robert Fico, a critic of sanctions against Russia, won the 2023 elections promising to prioritise national interests over support for Kiev; in Hungary, Viktor Orbán continues to make it difficult for the EU to make unanimous decisions on Ukraine, reflecting both historical affinities with Moscow and the calculation of a leader who presents himself as a defender of the well-being of his people against the supposed “war-mongering adventures” of Brussels. In Poland itself, where presidential elections were held on 1 June 2025, the winner was Karol Nawrocki, a national-conservative candidate who, while not completely opposed to military support for Kiev, is opposed to Ukraine’s membership in NATO and advocates a review of the ongoing sanctions against Russia, which he says are weighing too heavily on the Polish economy.

All of this illustrates a dynamic in which prolonging the war, with its costs and sacrifices, tends to strengthen political forces willing to break with the hard line against Putin. If the conflict drags on without a solution in sight, calls for “immediate peace” and redirecting resources from Ukraine to domestic problems are likely to gain more traction. In that case, the united European front – which has been crucial to Ukrainian resistance – could begin to crack, weakening material and diplomatic support for Kiev.

7 In the face of all these risks, it is clear that a continued escalation in the supply of arms cannot be an end in itself. Military firmness must be balanced with strategic prudence, otherwise the Western approach will degenerate into a dangerous dead end. To avoid both a military escalation — deliberate or inadvertent — and the erosion of political cohesion within the Western and European alliances, a dose of restraint and the construction of a credible horizon for a diplomatic solution are essential.

Experienced voices in international politics warn that military support and sanctions, without diplomatic means, will hardly be able to end the war on terms that are most favourable to Kiev ( PRIF ). Even the Ukrainian leadership recognises that, ultimately, any war ends in negotiations – although it stresses that these will only be possible if Russia shows itself willing to reach a fair settlement. However, waiting indefinitely for the adversary to capitulate or collapse carries the risks already outlined: escalation out of control or erosion of public support. In addition, it is not known for how long Russia will be able to keep the conflict alive, which it is interested in prolonging in order to delay Ukraine’s accession to NATO.

In this context, military aid must be complemented by clear diplomatic initiatives. The aim would be twofold: on the one hand, to send a message to Moscow that the door is open to compromise if the aggression ceases; on the other, to signal to European citizens that the leadership is committed to seeking peace responsibly, and not simply prolonging the war.

Of course, diplomacy does not imply unilateral concessions that reward Russian aggression, but rather exploring arrangements that aim to end hostilities in a sustainable way. Some analysts suggest new pan-European security dialogues, or involving emerging and non-aligned powers (e.g. India or China) to broker a ceasefire. Others point to the need for Europe to develop its own negotiating strategy, rather than simply reacting to the agenda of Washington or Moscow. The recent presidential change in the US, with the election of a leadership less committed to the Ukrainian cause, is a reminder that Europeans may need to take a greater diplomatic role. As one PRIF researcher suggests, rather than panicking and relying solely on the military route, Europe should “seize the diplomatic opportunity to secure its fate”. In parallel, crisis management experts stress the importance of keeping channels of dialogue open with the Kremlin even in times of tension, to manage crises and avoid fatal miscalculations ( rand.org ).

In short, containing the escalation also means thinking about the next day : preparing the ground for serious negotiations as soon as they become politically possible. This means avoiding irreversible steps that could escalate the conflict and beginning to articulate, albeit discreetly, visions of a possible peace agreement that guarantees safe coexistence and responds to broader security concerns. Only with this perspective of a negotiated solution – combined with calculated restraint on the military front – can we prevent the much-vaunted Western unity from dissolving into strategic fatigue and growing popular fatigue.

Germany’s decision to relax its military doctrine and allow Ukraine to use Western weapons without restriction illustrates the complex geopolitical dynamics that this war has unleashed. On the one hand, it reflects the West’s determination not to allow Moscow to dictate limits on its support for Kiev, closing loopholes in military aid that could be exploited by the Kremlin. On the other hand, it carries real risks—both of escalation, in the form of an aggressive Russian response (including the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons), and of deepening internal political divisions within the West as the war drags on and the costs and sacrifices mount. The current “German escalation,” symbolized by the Taurus missiles, is thus a microcosm of the broader dilemmas facing Europe: balancing firmness and responsibility, deterrence and dialogue.

In a high-intensity conflict involving a nuclear power, the margin for error is minimal. Strategic restraint is not weakness, but wisdom – it involves recognizing the limits of each escalation and weighing the side effects of each decision. Likewise, working towards a negotiated diplomatic solution – however distant it may seem today – does not weaken support for Ukraine; rather, it complements it with a long-term vision for regional peace and security. European cohesion, hard-won since the Russian invasion of 2022, cannot be taken for granted: it must be constantly reinforced with clear objectives and transparency towards public opinion. The longer the war drags on, the more public pressure increases to cut military and financial support to Kiev; it is up to European leaders to avoid falling into this political spiral, demonstrating that supporting Ukraine and seeking peace are not contradictory objectives.

Ultimately, the danger of the German escalation lies in reminding us that each additional level of escalation of the conflict brings new levels of risk. Recognizing this danger is the first step to responding to it with clarity. As Sun Tzu wrote, “the supreme art of war is to defeat the enemy without fighting.” For Germany and its European allies, this means deterring Russian aggression while keeping the door open for a negotiated solution—before the buildup of tensions leads to an outcome no one wants. Avoiding the abyss of uncontrolled escalation is now as imperative as sustaining Ukraine’s defense. Finding this delicate balance will be the acid test for European leadership in a conflict that has already redefined the continent’s security order.

CADMI – D. Maria I Analysis Center